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Abstract: This paper presents methodological development of MAGNET, a sophisticated 
agricultural variant of the well-known GTAP computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
for representing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Using original data on EU 
domestic support, it examines some likely macroeconomic effects in the European Union 
(EU) of the expected budget over the period 2014-2020. Results suggest that agreed budget 
cuts, in constant price, have limited impacts on EU and world markets, given the broadly 
non-distortive representation of present CAP policy. 
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1. Introduction  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains one of the central tenets of the European 
Union (née European Economic Community) project, which consists of over 500 million 
consumers, contains more than one-third of its land area classified as 'rural' and is a key 
player on world agri-food markets. Established in 1957 under the auspices of the Treaty of 
Rome, the raison d'etre of the CAP has evolved in the ensuing period. Since the 1992 CAP 
reform there was a sharp shift away from price to coupled, and then decoupled support, with 
a view toward the reduction of market distortions, greater provision of 'public goods' and an 
easing of the burden of targeting and, monitoring said payments. Alongside incremental 
policy changes, CAP expenditures constitute approximately 40 per cent of the EU budget 
nowadays, against 70 per cent in early 1970's. 
The allocation of CAP expenditures is subject to European objectives, regardless of the 
beneficiary member states. It is the financial corollary from the adoption of a common policy 
for EU agriculture.  Notwithstanding, the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council's decision to 
insert a rebate mechanism on the United Kingdom's net contribution to the European budget 
as well as resulting retroactive correction mechanisms for other member states runs against 
this principle of solidarity. As a consequence, budgetary return becomes the sticking point 
around the negotiating table when dealing with CAP reform,  especially for those EU 
members that receive rebates, large contributors such as Germany or large CAP recipients 
such as France.  
Taking a more holistic approach, some commentators (Le Cacheux, 2005) argue that the 
CAP budget should not be merely treated as a financial zero sum game, especially when 
considering the non-pecuniary advantages of European policies and integration. 
Notwithstanding, Boulanger (2011) observes that in times of high national public deficits and 
gross debt, political expediency tends to exacerbate member states' budgetary return stance 
within the negotiations. As an example of this, in June of 2013, a hard fought political 
agreement between member states was reached for the next seven year CAP budgetary 
                                                        
1 The authors are indebted to Arnaldo Caivano for data support, to Robert M'barek, Sophie Hélaine, Hans van Meijl and the 
MAGNET team at LEI, and Alexandre Gohin for helpful suggestions. Any errors remain the responsibility of the authors 
whose on-going research aims at further refining the data and modelling work. The views expressed are purely those of the 
authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission. 
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allocation – the so-called multiannual financial framework (MFF). This deal contemplates a 
decrease in CAP expenditures for the 2014-2020 MFF. 
There is a lack of published modelling literature examining the impacts of CAP budget 
reform. One example is Nowicki et al. (2009), who explicitly model the CAP budget 
mechanism and analyse (inter alia) the effect of a 75% budgetary reduction in real terms 
(55% in nominal term). This reduction is achieved via elimination of pillar 1 support (market 
measures and direct payments) and increases in pillar 2 support (rural development measures) 
by 100%. The liberalization scenario also anticipates the removal of trade measures. Results 
suggest that except for livestock, cuts in direct payments have little effect on European 
agricultural production but significant impacts on agricultural income and the number of 
farms. Although this paper offers interesting insights, it does not provide a comprehensive 
representation of pillar 2 rural development payments.  This common omission in modelling 
studies is largely due to the heavy data demands of including these payments as well as the 
heterogeneity in implementation strategies across national/regional borders (Psaltopoulos et 
al, 2012).   
The current paper employs a multi-sector market model approach to estimate the welfare, 
macro and sectoral impacts of the current political agreement on CAP budget cuts. To 
significantly improve the assessment, a rich dataset of pillar 2 payments is employed; a 
highly detailed baseline scenario is implemented capturing actual payment changes to 
specific member state EU agricultural sectors under the CAP Health Check reforms 
(including the re-coupling of support payments, i.e. article 68); and an account of the CAP 
budget 'own resources' mechanism to track both payments to, and from, member states 
originating from the CAP budget.  The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two 
discusses the methodology. Section three analyses effects of the 2014-2020 CAP budget 
political agreement on welfare, trade, factors and product markets. Section four provides 
some concluding remarks.  
2. Methodology 
2.1 Modelling framework 
For advanced applied trade policy analysis, the GTAP toolkit (Hertel, 1997) constitutes an 
important point of departure. Notwithstanding, additional modelling and data work are 
necessary in state-of-the-art CGE applications to fully explore the policy question at hand. As 
a first step, the paper employs a GTAP model variant known as the Modular Agricultural 
GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET).
2
 A key strength of the MAGNET model is that it 
allows the user to choose a la carte those sub-modules of relevance to the study. In the 
context of the current work aims, additional modules are ‘activated’ to capture the 
specificities of agricultural factor and product markets. Thus, modifications to the nesting 
structures characterise the heterogeneity of land usage by agricultural activity; a regional 
endogenous land supply function; the sluggishness of capital and labour transfer between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors with associated wage and rent differentials; the 
inclusion of substitution possibilities between feed inputs in the livestock sectors; and 
additional behavioural and accounting equations to explicitly characterise EU agricultural 
policy mechanisms (that is, production quotas, single farm payment, pillar 2 payments). In 
addition to the standard MAGNET model, further in-house refinements to the GTAP data and 
MAGNET model structure are included to improve the precision of the study.  
                                                        
2 MAGNET is part of the integrated Modelling Platform for Agro-economic Commodity and Policy Analysis (iMAP) hosted 
by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (M'barek et al., 2012). 
For a fuller description of the MAGNET model see Woltjer and Kuiper (2013). 
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2.2 EU domestic support allocation 
The treatment of the CAP budget in MAGNET calculates total CAP expenditures to each 
EU member state by adding up all subsidies on primary factors employed in agriculture. 
Importantly, all decoupled payments are calibrated to the land factor assuming equal subsidy 
rates across all agricultural sectors. This representation of decoupled support assumes that the 
single farm payment (SFP) is production neutral, excludes cross commodity effects and 
capitalises the entire SFP into the value of land. This modelling assumption has important 
implications. A sensitivity analysis on support allocations would be required to better capture 
potential market distorting effects of domestic support, especially SFPs.
3
  
The numerous pillar 2 initiatives are aggregated to five categories, i.e. agri-environmental, 
least favoured area, physical capital, human capital and other investment mechanisms. Pillar 
2 payments on agro-environmental schemes and least favoured areas are tied to the land 
factor following Nowicki et al. (2009). Additional pillar 2 expenditures on physical capital, 
human capital and other investment mechanisms are captured within the CAP budget, but are 
not calibrated to any subsidy wedge. Importantly, since domestic support values are included 
within ad valorem subsidy rates, then CAP support values change in response to price and 
quantity changes, NOT policy driven decisions. Ideally, in a market model, CAP support 
should be fixed. Consequently, the CAP accounts module adjusts subsidy rates such that 
changes in CAP support remain fixed (either in nominal or real terms). Pillar 2 subsidies are 
assumed to affect productivity (i.e., output and input augmenting technological change). 
More specifically, in level terms, output augmenting technical change (OA) in each of the ‘j’ 
agricultural sectors follows an ad hoc endogenous specification (dropping the regional 
subscripts): 
        (A.1) 
where and are technical parameters with respect to changing CAP budget 
expenditures on human capital (HK), physical capital (PK) and other investment schemes 
(OTH) (where the latter are not specific to agriculture). Thus, the marginal change in output 
augmenting technical change is the technical change parameter multiplied by the ratio of 
CAP pillar 2 expenditure to the value of output or agricultural physical capital which 
corresponds to each pillar 2 payment type. The parameterisation of euro payments into 
productivity changes is taken from the literature and expert opinion, i.e. 'human capital' = 0.4; 
'physical capital' = 0.3; 'other investment' = 0.1; 'agri-environmental schemes' = -0.05
 
(Woltjer and Kuiper, 2013).
4
 To carry out sensitivity analyses appears here critical in order to 
endorse accuracy of these parameters. 
In the non-primary agricultural sectors, output augmenting technical change is assumed to 
respond to changing OTH expenditures only (dropping the regional subscripts): 
                                                        
3 Urban et al (2012) stresses this point and proposes alternative allocation of support related either on (i) factor usage, (ii) 
50% on land, 25% on labour, 25% on capital, or (iii) 100% on land. The paper concludes on the need to test econometrically 
degrees and modes of coupling if one wants to model accurately SFPs. 
4 Evenson (2001) estimates a rate of return of 40% for human capital investments; Nowicki et al. (2009) estimates a rate of 
return of 30% for physical capital investments based on Wolff (1996) and Gittleman, ten Raab & Wolff (2006). Productivity 
effects of other investments and agri-environmental schemes are based on expert opinions. There is no deadweight loss, i.e. 
100% of the payment is effective (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2013).  
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     (A.2) 
  Finally, agro-environmental pillar 2 payments are calibrated as subsidies on the land factor 
and also have negative productivity effects. The rationale is that this class of payments 
reward farmers for the provision of land use changes which fulfil agro-environmental criteria. 
Consequently, these payments reduce agricultural efficiency on the existing intensity of non-
land factors below what would be the case in their absence. Intuitively, the reduction in agro-
environmental payments results in positive productivity effects. In levels terms, the 
endogenous specification for changes in (non-land) factor augmenting technical change (FA) 
in agricultural sectors is given below (dropping the regional subscripts): 
AGRICjNLANDfEVFAAEFA
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   (A.3) 
2.3 Budget resources and rebates 
From a modelling perspective, the MAGNET treatment of the CAP budget does not include 
an ‘own resources’ component. Thus, additional accounting and behavioural equations are 
inserted to complete the accounts of the CAP budget. At the outset, only the CAP component 
of the EU budget is modelled, where the CAP expenditure share of the EU budget share is 
falling (exogenously) over time employing financial framework projections data and own 
calculations (see scenario design). This CAP expenditure share is employed to estimate those 
resource costs from member states which correspond to the CAP component of the EU 
budget.  
Thus, in line with EU law, 75% of tariff revenue is collected (the remaining 25% is 
assigned to administrative costs), whilst GTAP data on value added tax contributions is 
incomplete and consequently not employed in the CAP budget module. The difference 
between member state receipts (i.e., from pillar 1 and 2) and member state contributions from 
import tariffs multiplied by a CAP budget expenditure share, gives an aggregate EU resource 
cost. This shortfall is met by an EU-wide uniform GDP contribution rate by each member 
state. Thus, whilst the EU budget balances, at the member state level a region may be a net 
contributor (regional income < regional expenditure) or a net beneficiary (regional income > 
regional expenditure).  
Further accounting equations are inserted to consider the UK rebate and subsequent 
corrections to other member states in response to this distorting mechanism. In accordance 
with the EU budgetary agreement, the UK recovers 66% of its net contribution (if in deficit). 
From 2014, Denmark also receives an annual lump sum payment. Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden only pay 25% of their GDP share contribution, whilst the latter two 
also receive an annual lump sum compensation payment. In the 2007 benchmark, the CAP 
budget only applies to the EU27 regions. Additional exogenous dummy variables are 
employed to incorporate Croatia both within the CAP budget own resources, the UK rebate 
and subsequent member state correction mechanisms (in line with 2013 MFF Agreement). 
2.4 Aggregation, baseline and scenario design 
For the purposes of this work, the GTAP data is aggregated to 21 tradables, of which 17 are 
agri-food related, and 28 countries or regions (Box 2). In terms of the regional 
disaggregation, those European countries which benefit from budget rebates are separated, 
(i.e. United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark). As significant 
recipients of CAP funding, France, Spain and Italy are disaggregated, whilst Poland and 
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Romania represent large recipient new member states from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, 
respectively. The remaining EU countries are aggregated into 'Other EU15' and 'Other EU12'. 
Lastly, as the 28th EU member state from July 1st, 2013, Croatia is treated separately. To 
examine third country impacts from CAP budget reform, non EU regions are grouped into 
either 'large players' on global agri-food markets or impoverished partners. All residual trade 
and output flows are captured within a Rest of the Word (ROW) region. 
In terms of the model closure, all policy variables (ad valorem taxes and tariffs) are 
assumed exogenous. An exogenous region specific technical change variable is shocked to 
meet targeted real GDP projections, whilst exogenous land productivity shocks are also 
contemplated. Additional output- and input-augmenting technical changes in relation to pillar 
2 expenditures are treated endogenously. As in the standard GTAP model, all primary factor 
endowments (except land) are exogenous. Labour projections follow changes in regional 
population, whilst capital endowment shocks are equal to regional real GDP forecasts (i.e., 
fixed capital-output ratio). Data on GDP and population are sourced from USDA (2013) 
whilst land productivity data is from IMAGE (Bruinsma, 2003). 
Box 2: GTAP data aggregation 
 Sectoral disaggregation (21 GTAP sectors) 
Wheat; Other grains; Oilseeds; Raw sugar; Vegetables, fruits and nuts; Other crops; Cattle and Sheep; Pigs and 
Poultry; Raw Milk; Wool; Red Meat; White Meat; Dairy; Sugar Processing; Other Food Processing; 
Beverages and Tobacco; Energy; Extraction; Manufacturing; Services. 
 Regional disaggregation (28 GTAP regions) 
United Kingdom; Netherlands; Sweden; Denmark; Germany; Austria; France; Italy; Spain; RoEu15; Poland; 
Romania; RoEU12; Croatia; EFTA; USA; Canada; Mercosur; Russian Federation; Eastern Partnership; China; 
India; Japan; Australia & New Zealand; Middle East & North Africa; Everything But Arms; Rest of South 
Saharan Africa; Rest of the World. 
It is assumed that regional investment demand is allocated such that expected rates of return 
across regions are equated subject to exogenous projections of regional capital stocks. 
Moreover, the MAGNET model variant used here employs a recursive dynamic treatment of 
investment behaviour which ensures that investment distribution across regions is consistent 
with exogenous shocks in capital over time periods. The standard neoclassical macro closure 
ensures that withdrawals (i.e., savings and imports) equal injections (i.e., investment and 
exports) such that the balance of payments is zero. In this modelling work, this is modified to 
include additional injections and withdrawals arising from CAP budget receipts and 
payments to/from each member state.  
The baseline (Box 3) is implemented over two time periods (2007-2013-2020) which 
coincide with the MFF and Croatia’s accession to the EU. The baseline consists of an array of 
macro projections, envisaged trade policy shocks and CAP policy shocks. Within this time 
horizon, additional multilateral (i.e., Doha) and some bilateral (i.e., USA, Canada, Mercosur, 
Japan, etc.) trade shocks are not contemplated due to the uncertainty of a firm timetable for 
agreement.  In addition, the baseline includes detailed pillar 1 and 2 expenditure shocks based 
on 2011 financial year's real expenditure (not ceiling limits) changes to specific member state 
EU agricultural sectors under the CAP Health Check reforms. Given the co-financed nature 
of pillar 2 support, additional nationally funded pillar 2 expenditure shocks are also 
implemented in the first period based on European Commission’s CATS (DG agri) database.5 
                                                        
5 We use also CATS database (Clearance of Account Trail System) to recalibrate existing EU domestic support for the 2007 
benchmark (Jensen, 2010), allowing a more comprehensive representation of pillar 2 accounts, and a re-representation of 
pillar 1 payments. CATS database collects detailed information submitted by the member states to the Commission about 
CAP individual payments, for auditing and statistical purposes. 
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It is assumed that both the co-finance rates and the allocation of pillar 2 expenditures within 
member states in the second period remain the same as in the first period.   
In addition to all of these baseline shocks, a CAP budget scenario is explored in the second 
period. Both exogenous pillar 1 and 2 expenditure reductions and exogenous CAP 
expenditure share reductions of the EU budget are implemented assuming that the non-
agricultural spending concepts remain unchanged.  Budget cuts reflect the political agreement 
reached on June 27, 2013, with 13% and 18% cuts in pillar 1 and pillar 2 expenditures, 
respectively (European Council, 2013) in comparison to the 2020 baseline. These cuts in 
constant price have been approved by the European Parliament on November 19, 2013, and 
European Council on December 2, 2013. 
It should be made clear that the analysis does not account for member states' possibilities to 
transfer up to 15% of their envelopes between pillars and any further redistribution of 
decoupled payments among and between them. Thus no changes in decoupling schemes 
(regional, historical, hybrid) are assumed for the next period. Also agreed ceiling are 
respected during the 2014-2020 period, i.e. no financial discipline mechanism is activated. 
Box 3: Assumptions shaping the baseline scenario 
I. Baseline shocks (2007-2013 period) 
I.a. Projections 
 Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP 
I.b Trade Policy Shocks 
 Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations with the Everything But Arms countries 
I.c Agricultural Policy (including 2008 Health Check reforms) 
 Phasing in of decoupled payments for 2004 and 2007 accession members 
 Removal of specific pillar 1 coupled support: arable crops, olives and hops to be fully decoupled from 
2010; Seeds, beef and veal payments (except the suckler cow premium) decoupled by 2012, Protein 
crops, rice and nuts will be decoupled by 1 January 2012, Abolish the energy crop premium in 2010 
 Re-coupling of support under the article 68 provision 
 Pillar 2 payments to the EU27 under the financial framework  
 Cumulative shocks for milk quotas rise of 1 per cent annually from 2009 to 2013   
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget 
 Change in Swedish and Dutch rebates corresponding to CAP expenditure share of EU budget 
II. Baseline shocks (2013-2020 period) 
II.a Projections 
 Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP 
II.b Trade Policy Shocks 
 Accession of Croatia to the EU, included adoption of common external tariff and trade policy 
 Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations with MENA, Eastern Partnership and Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Removal of all export refunds 
II.c Agricultural Policy 
 CAP budget envelope remains the same as in 2013 as well as pillar 2 co-finance rates 
 Adoption of CAP by Croatia, including pillar 2 payments extended to Croatia 
 Phasing in of decoupled payments for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
 Abolition of raw milk (2015) and raw sugar (2017) quotas 
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget 
 Change in Swedish, Dutch and Danish lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP expenditure share in 
EU budget. UK rebate is maintained. Croatia incorporates rebate mechanism 
3. Results  
3.1 CAP budget scenario 
In this section, estimates are presented in comparison with the baseline (status quo) 
scenario. The complexity of the CGE model framework renders a full discussion of all the 
model results as unwieldy. Thus, the focus is on the CAP budgetary and welfare effects, as 
7 
 
 
 
well as the impacts on trade, factors, output and prices. To understand the driving mechanism 
behind the results, a useful starting point is the representation of the revenues and costs 
corresponding to the CAP budget at the end of the baseline period 2007-2013 (top of Table 
1). The first row shows CAP receipts of €52,340 million accruing to the EU member states. 
This total is split between pillars 1 and 2 amounting to €41,114 million and €11,222 million, 
respectively. Of the former, decoupled payments total €38,435 million and remaining 
coupled payments sum to €2,684 million.  These costs are met by member state CAP budget 
contributions in the form of tariff revenues and GDP, which are scaled according to the CAP 
share of the EU budget. The rebate row accounts for the net impacts on EU members of both 
the UK rebate and retroactive correction mechanisms to other member states. The net 
position shows that most of the EU15 is a net contributor to the CAP budget, whilst the 
newer member states are net beneficiaries. This underlies the redistributive nature of the 
CAP. Although France is a large recipient of CAP budget funding, it does not receive special 
dispensation such that it remains a net contributor.   
The Austrian rebate (in the form of reduced GDP contributions), on the other hand, renders 
this country as a small net beneficiary from the CAP. As expected, Spain and the RoEU15 
(including Greece and Portugal) are net beneficiary Member States from CAP budgetary 
funding. As a percentage of GDP the largest contributors are Germany and the Netherlands 
(0.18% and 0.15% respectively) despite the fact that both receive partial rebates. Moreover, 
even with a sizeable rebate, the UK is still a net contributor to the CAP portion of the EU 
budget (-€1,733 million or 0.08% GDP). The newer member states typically receive net 
support which amounts to between 0.6 to 0.8% of GDP.  
On the basis of these estimates, a CAP budget cut would benefit (detriment) net 
contributors (net beneficiaries) in the form of a taxpayer saving (loss). In the model, income 
changes feedback to each economy as an increase (decrease) in expenditure and savings. This 
effect is demonstrated in the lower part of Table 1.  
3.2 Impacts on welfare 
As an initial observation, results of CAP budget decrease are consistent in terms of the 
comparative magnitudes across Member States and the signs of the estimates. Notice that the 
expected EU CAP budget cut implies relatively small adjustment costs with the largest gainer 
(loser) being Germany (Poland) with an monetary gain (loss) of €589 million (-€356 million). 
Decomposition of the real income (equivalent variation (EV)) changes for a selection of 
regions is presented in Table 2. Measured in per capita income terms, the impacts are small 
owing to the localised nature of the incremental shocks (i.e., restricted to EU agriculture). In 
the EU, the largest per capita real income gains accrue to the net contributors, the 
Netherlands and Germany. This is consistent with the CAP budget cost as a percentage of 
GDP statistic reported in Table 1. Under a similar line of reasoning, the biggest per capita 
income losers are the new member states, especially Romania (-0.2%).The EV results suggest 
that the EU28 does not undergo a zero sum gain owing to the larger EV losses accruing to the 
‘new’ EU member states (EUN13) vis-à-vis the EV gains of the ‘old’ EU member states 
(EU15). This result is driven by the endowment and technology effects (see below). 
 Decomposing EV into money metric measures within the EU, the dominating driver is the 
CAP budget effect (CAP), resulting in EV gains for the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and 
France and concomitant losses in Spain, Poland and Romania. Elsewhere, EU members 
generally realise allocative efficiency (Alloc) gains due to the contraction in agricultural 
activities; increased imports of tariffed manufactured goods; and output rises in domestic 
services sectors.   
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Table 1: The CAP Budget in 2013 and 2020 (€millions, 2007 prices) 
CAP budget in 2013 
 
UK NL SE DK DE AT FR IT ES Rof15 PL RO Rof12 HR EU28 
1. CAP receipts 3671 1228 930 964 6410 1242 8390 5084 6096 6708 4359 1816 5443 0 52340 
Pillar I: decoupled support 3013 1115 654 888 5177 622 6888 3752 4352 4633 2744 1018 3579 0 38435 
Pillar I: coupled support 62 43 10 21 88 80 728 250 761 510 27 43 61 0 2684 
Pillar 2: LFAs 54 1 41 1 157 126 292 105 72 419 243 109 289 0 1909 
Pillar 2: agri-environmental 348 22 149 27 364 272 218 341 392 510 241 112 524 0 3521 
Pillar 2: physical capital 73 12 26 5 288 56 120 413 303 340 278 135 475 0 2526 
Pillar 2: human capital 20 1 12 8 4 15 71 103 90 157 403 53 105 0 1044 
Pillar 2: other investment 96 34 37 14 332 70 73 123 127 138 423 346 409 0 2222 
2. CAP contribution 8458 2537 1487 953 10822 1152 7708 5933 4055 4925 1635 605 2070 0 52340 
3. Rebates 3054 431 89 -96 -325 -37 -932 -697 -471 -532 -190 -70 -224 0 0 
4. Net position -1733 -878 -468 -85 -4737 53 -250 -1546 1571 1251 2534 1141 3149 0 0 
% of GDP -0.08 -0.15 -0.12 -0.04 -0.18 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.16 0.11 0.63 0.76 0.66 0.00  
CAP budget cut vs. baseline in 2020 
1. CAP receipts -507 -163 -134 -128 -891 -188 -1129 -716 -842 -950 -646 -253 -574 -65 -7187 
2. CAP contribution -1199 -336 -204 -132 -1439 -157 -1050 -760 -539 -674 -260 -96 -312 -28 -7187 
3. Rebates -445 -36 -6 6 40 5 128 90 64 75 31 11 35 3 0 
4. Net position 246 137 64 10 589 -26 49 135 -239 -202 -356 -146 -228 -33 0 
Note: see body of the text for aggregate specification (section 2). Source: MAGNET results 
 
Table 2: Decomposition of effects on real income (equivalent variation) vs. baseline in 2020 (€millions, 2007 prices) 
 UK NL DE FR ES PL RO EU15 EU13 EFTA USA MERC AUSNZ CHN IND JAP LDC 
 
    EV 299 182 593 14 -346 -723 -321 482 -1525 -11 103 141 26 -30 -4 -8 54 
per cap U (%) 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.15 -0.20 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Decomposition: 
Alloc 19 14 91 32 -11 -39 -34 241 -63 -9 1 23 2 -11 36 -3 6 
ToT 24 41 53 20 -39 -77 -95 27 -218 -5 72 89 19 -19 -16 -6 27 
Endw 3 -7 -89 -61 -12 -65 -13 -323 -149 3 16 17 1 -25 -22 1 8 
Tech 4 -4 -42 -28 -38 -194 -42 -213 -352 0 8 7 2 23 -3 0 8 
Pop 6 3 -4 1 -8 4 3 -4 11 0 6 5 1 2 1 0 4 
CAP 243 135 585 49 -238 -353 -141 754 -753 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: see body of the text for acronyms' specification (section 3). Source: MAGNET results 
In Spain, Poland and Romania, although subsidised agricultural activity contracts (i.e., 
allocative efficiency gain), manufacturing imports and domestic services output also fall 
relative to the baseline resulting in net allocative efficiency falls. As the unit price ratio of 
exchange between exports and imports, the terms of trade (ToT) impact within the EU is the 
net result of (i) increasing agri-food prices from partial elimination of agricultural support and 
(ii) falls in the real exchange rate (i.e., factor prices).  The endowment effect (Endw) measures 
incremental real income impacts through changes in factor usage. This value is reported as 
negative within the EU due to the idling of agricultural land under the CAP budget cuts and is 
an explanatory factor for the fall in EU28 EV. 
The technology measure (Tech) captures the money metric equivalent from improvements 
in output or input augmenting technical change. Under the budget cuts, reductions in pillar 2 
investments in human and physical capital in agriculture; as well as other regional payments; 
generate further productivity losses in agricultural and (to a lesser extent) non-agricultural 
sectors. This negative effect is particularly pronounced in Poland. In contrast, the UK and 
Austria witness small positive technological EV gains at the margin with agricultural support 
reductions. This is because approximately 60 per cent of UK and Austrian pillar 2 expenditure 
(including co-financed support) fund agri-environmental extensification measures i.e. imply a 
negative land productivity effect. Outside the EU, per capita real income impacts are 
negligible due to the largely non-distortionary nature of EU agricultural policy, 
Notwithstanding, the results clearly show that agricultural net exporters (e.g., USA, MERC, 
AUSNZ) gain, with concurrent reductions in net importing regions (EFTA, China, India, 
Japan). This reflects the slight increase in agricultural export prices which has a beneficial 
(detrimental) ToT impact for agricultural net exporters (importers).  
3.3 Trade impacts 
In policy terms, for net CAP budget contributors, real income rises are accompanied by rises 
in the marginal propensity to import, resulting in trade balance deteriorations. The opposite 
effect applies in the case of the net beneficiary EU Member States with falling EV under the 
budget cuts. The EU28 agriculture and food trade balances deteriorate -€410 million and -
€260 million, respectively. As expected, non-EU28 agri-food trade balances undergo small 
improvements in the agricultural net exporting regions (e.g., USA, MERC & AUSNZ). It is 
worth noting, however, that since most CAP budget support is decoupled, it is assumed 
production neutral such that the distortive impacts on trade and world prices are minimal.  
Under the current political agreement for CAP budget reform, the EU15 trade balance 
deteriorates by -€681 million, whilst the EUN13 trade balance improves €1,528 million. Since 
the EV loss for the EUN13 exceeds the EU15 EV gain, the EU28 trade balance consequently 
improves €847 million. Under the general closed system of global accounting equations, an 
improved EU28 net trade balance is accompanied by a corresponding (minor) deterioration in 
non-EU region trade balances. Across the EU’s non agri-food sectors, the trend follows that 
of the macro trade balance. Thus, in the EU15, with a rising propensity to import (and higher 
income elasticities for non-food products), the trade balances deteriorate in manufacturing and 
services by -€278 million and -€12 million, respectively. In the EUN13, the reverse occurs 
leading to corresponding estimates of €1,501 million and €269 million.  
3.4 Impacts on factors and product markets 
In Table 3 are shown output and price impacts in selected Member States.
6
 As expected the 
rise in agricultural market prices, which is driven in large part by marginal cost increases in 
                                                        
6 Corresponding simulation estimates in the non-EU regions are not shown since the results are negligible. 
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land rents paid by the farmer (row 2, Table 3), is positively related to the magnitude of the 
CAP support cuts.
7
  
Table 3: Market price and output effect vs. baseline in 2020 (% changes) 
 
Market price effect Output effects 
UK DE FR PL EU28 UK DE FR PL EU28 
Land (owner) -5.80 -3.76 -4.97 -3.15 -4.06 -0.07 -0.82 -0.54 -0.45 -0.51 
Land (farmer) 2.35 6.91 4.98 2.81 4.34 -0.07 -0.82 -0.54 -0.45 -0.51 
Wheat 0.17 0.33 0.24 1.01 0.29 0.06 -0.24 -0.18 -1.42 -0.29 
Oil grains 0.08 0.38 0.26 1.45 0.46 0.22 -0.18 -0.07 -0.87 -0.24 
Oil seeds 0.20 0.39 0.35 1.02 0.39 0.00 -0.23 -0.18 -1.41 -0.29 
Raw sugar 0.01 0.54 0.45 3.08 0.56 0.08 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 
Vegetables, fruits, nuts 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.13 0.30 0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -1.43 -0.17 
Cattle, sheep and goats 0.23 0.31 0.97 1.22 0.72 0.12 -0.01 -0.35 -0.98 -0.26 
Pigs and poultry 0.11 0.33 0.28 1.24 0.44 0.14 -0.21 -0.11 -1.04 -0.25 
Raw milk 0.01 0.60 0.37 2.54 0.59 0.11 -0.26 -0.03 -0.34 -0.14 
AGRICULTURE 0.12 0.38 0.36 1.32 0.43 0.12 -0.21 -0.15 -1.06 -0.22 
Red meat 0.11 0.17 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.00 -0.11 -0.39 -0.53 -0.32 
White meat 0.08 0.20 0.15 0.46 0.15 0.18 -0.28 -0.12 -0.98 -0.22 
Dairy 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.12 -0.31 -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 
Sugar -0.01 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 
Vegetable oils and fats 0.01 0.06 0.16 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 -0.32 -0.45 0.36 -0.07 
FOOD 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.36 -0.08 
NAT. ENERGY 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
MANUFACTURING 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.17 0.01 
SERVICES 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.00 
Note: Output effects on land do not differentiate owner and farmer. Source: MAGNET results 
Rising agricultural prices are transmitted to downstream processors, whose prices are also 
positively related to the size of support cuts. Given this loss of competitiveness, agriculture 
and food production falls in the EU, although the relative impact is less than 1% for the 
EU28. On the one hand, this is because most agricultural support is production neutral. 
Indeed, even in those Member States (e.g., France, Spain) which employ recoupling policies 
under the auspices of article 68, decoupled support still constitutes the majority of pillar 1 
(90% and 85%, respectively). Moreover, given the medium run modelling assumption 
regarding the restricted movement of capital and labour to, and from agriculture, as well as 
the restrictions on land use changes, agricultural supply responsiveness is expected to be 
inelastic.
8
 The larger price rises and production falls in Polish agriculture reflect the 
observation above regarding the loss of relatively greater productivity inducing pillar 2 
investment payments. Applying a similar logic, UK agricultural activity increases slightly 
from CAP budget cuts since the reduction in its relatively large agri-environmental payments 
implies that UK agriculture becomes less extensive.  
In the EU28 land market, falls in aggregate demand result in (marginal) land abandonment 
of about -0.5%. Due to the inelastic nature of the land supply curves, EU28 landowner rents 
(row 1, Table 3) fall more sharply, averaging -4%. In policy terms, this represents the lost 
capitalisation of land rents from reductions in the single farm payment. 
                                                        
7 Decoupled payments (i.e., land subsidy) are calibrated to the land factor and therefore drive a wedge between the rent that 
the landowner receives (who may, or may not be the farmer) and the lower rental price of land paid by the user (i.e., farmer). 
Removing partially this support (or land subsidy) implies that the seller's rental rate falls relative to the users rental rate – or 
in other words, there is a lost capitalization of the land rental price to the landowner.  
8 Compared with the standard GTAP model, in this paper agricultural labour (mainly unskilled) and capital accept larger 
wage or rent falls before moving to other sectors 
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In the services sector, there is a greater intensity of ‘skilled labour’ so it is less affected by 
sectorally trapped agricultural unskilled labour. Moreover, the import dependency ratio for 
services within the EU is considerably below that for manufacturing (i.e., less import 
competition). Thus, in those Member States where real income improves from CAP budget 
cuts (e.g., UK, Germany, France), services output rises slightly due to real income induced 
domestic demand increases. Using a similar logic, in Member States where real income falls 
(e.g., Poland), services output also contracts. In the UK, since the services industry is 
relatively prominent as a proportion of GDP, real income rises, leading to real growth 
improvement and concomitant real exchange rate rises in labour and capital factors (not 
shown).   
4. Concluding remarks  
This paper presents methodological improvement of MAGNET, a sophisticated agricultural 
variant of the well-known GTAP computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for 
representing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Using original data on EU domestic 
support, it examines the potential trade and welfare implications arising from a reform to the 
CAP budget. A main finding is that the cuts in the CAP budget have relatively limited 
impacts on third countries, or indeed EU agricultural output. To a large extent, this is to be 
expected owing to the modelling representation of the decoupled payments. In the literature, 
there are a number of possible channels coupling farmer production decision’s to decoupled 
payments (Moro and Sckokai, 2013). Owing to the degree of empirical uncertainty regarding 
the appropriate ‘coupling factor’, this analysis only contemplates production neutral 
behaviour. Consequently, the main production effects arise from changes in pillar 2 
expenditures and their associated productivity effects in EU Member States. Undertaking 
sensitivity analysis with alternative allocation of support to factors would be needed. 
As a further remark, the complex system of intra-community transfers via the budget 
mechanism implies that policy induced changes to CAP support have, at the margin, real 
income and trade balance implications. Compared to the aforementioned production impacts 
these income induced effects have a relatively greater outcome on resource reallocations 
across all sectors within the EU and, to a lesser extent, third country trade effects. Indeed EU 
budget net beneficiaries (e.g., Poland, EUN13 as an aggregate) will experience EV losses, 
whereas net contributors will benefit (e.g., Germany, EU15 as an aggregate).  
Notwithstanding, as is the case in all empirical studies, a number of caveats should be 
observed. Firstly, no assumption is made regarding how, for example, potential taxpayer 
savings (losses) from CAP budget reductions are allocated within national economies. In the 
current analysis, this is manifested as a rise (fall) in savings and domestic demand. Other 
possibilities that could be explored, however, are the diversion of funds to research and 
development activities, or perhaps as a subsidy to labour. Alternative assumptions will clearly 
have different implications on economic performance. Secondly, the elasticity between pillar 
2 expenditure changes and productivity changes is currently subject to qualitative expectation.  
Although further literature is emerging (Mary, 2013), additional research is necessary.  
Related to this is the potential reverse 'crowding out effect' from withdrawal of EU pillar 2 
investments. In other words, to what extent could substitute private investment mitigate lost 
productivity reductions, particularly those observed in the newer member states. Finally, the 
EU28 losses reported here are biased by the interpretation of the endowment effect. The 
productivity loss from removal of more marginal land is overstated since it is currently 
assumed that all land units have equal productivity. Additionally, whilst agricultural land 
which falls out of production registers as a loss to the economy, there is no mitigating 
mechanism for its possible uptake in non-agricultural uses.   
12 
 
5. References  
Boulanger, P. (2011). Quelle réforme pour la Politique agricole commune et le budget 
européen? Politique étrangère 76(2): 343-358. 
Bruinsma, J. (2003). World agriculture: towards 2015/2030: an FAO perspective. Earthscan 
and FAO, Rome. http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y4252E/y4252e00.htm#TopOfPage 
European Council, 2013. Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework), EUCO 37/13, 
28.02.2013, Brussels. 
Hertel, T.W. (ed.) (1997). Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Evenson, R.E. (2001). Economic Impacts of Agricultural Research and Extension. In 
Gardner, B.L. and Rausser, G. (eds), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Vol 1A, New 
York, North Holland: 574-628. 
Gittleman, M., ten Raab, T. and Wolff, E.N. (2006). The vintage effect in TFP-growth: An 
analysis of the age structure of capital. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 17: 306-
328. 
Jensen, H.G. (2010). Chapter 10.G: EU Domestic Support Data for GTAP 7.1 Data Base. In 
Narayanan, B.G. and Walmsley, T.L (eds) (2008) Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: 
The GTAP 7 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/5000.pdf 
Le Cacheux, J. (2005). European Budget: the poisonous budget rebate debate. Studies & 
Research n°41, Notre Europe, Paris. http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etud41-n.pdf?pdf=ok 
Mary, S. (2013). Assessing the Impacts of Pillar 1 and 2 Subsidies on TFP in French Crop 
Farms. Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(1): 133-144. 
M’barek, R., Britz, W., Burrell, A. and Delincé, J. (2012). An integrated Modelling 
Platform for Agro-economic Commodity and Policy Analysis (iMAP) – a look back and the 
way forward. JRC Scientific and Policy Report, EUR 25267, Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union. http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69667.pdf 
Moro, D. and Sckokai, P. (2013). The impact of decoupled payments on farm choices: 
Conceptual and methodological challenges. Food Policy 41 (August): 28–38. 
Nowicki, P., Goba, V., Knierim, A., van Meijl, H., Banse, M., Delbaere, B., Helming, J., 
Hunke, P., Jansson, K., Jansson, T., Jones-Walters, L., Mikos, V., Sattler, C., Schlaefke, N., 
Terluin, I. and Verhoog, D. (2009). Scenar 2020-II – Update of Analysis of Prospects in the 
Scenar 2020 Study – Contract No. 30-CE-0200286/00-21. European Commission, 
Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development, Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/external/scenar2020ii/report_en.pdf 
Psaltopoulos, D., Phimister, E., Ratinger, T., Roberts, D., Skuras, D., Bednarikova, Z., 
Espinosa, M., Gomez y Paloma, S., Mary, S., Nohel, F. and Santini, F. (2012). Ex-ante 
Spatial Policy Impact Analysis of the Rural Development policy in European Rural Areas 
(RURAL ECMOD). JRC Scientific and Policy Report, EUR 25238, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union. http://ftp.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/JRC68412.pdf 
Urban, K., Jensen, H.G. and Brockmeier, M. (2012). How Decoupled is the SFP in GTAP: 
Using a Sensitivity Analysis to Uncover the Degree of Coupling. Paper prepared for 
presentation at the 15th annual GTAP conference, Geneva, June 27-29. 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/6014.pdf 
USDA (2013). International Macroeconomic Dataset. Economic Research Service, USDA. 
accessed on 21.06.2013 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products.aspx 
Wolff, E.N. (1996). The productivity slowdown: the culprit at last? American Economic 
Review 86 (5) December: 1239-1252. 
Woltjer, G. and Kuiper, M. (eds.), 2013. The MAGNET model, Module description. 
February, LEI, The Hague. 
